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The May 11 snap elections in Serbia were a
result of a crisis in the coalition government between the hard-line
nationalists represented by Premier Vojislav Kostunica and the liberals
represented by President Boris Tadic.
In the elections, Kostunica's party, the Democratic Party of Serbia
(DSS), was allied with the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), an extreme
right neofascist party, whose leader, Vojislav Seselj, is currently
being held in The Hague court prison as an accused war criminal.
Tadic’s party, the Democratic Party (DS), was in coalition with other
liberal parties, such as G17 Plus and a number of parties of national
minorities.
The liberals did substantially better than the pre-election polls had
projected, outdistancing the Radicals by 10 percent. But the
nationalist parties together, if they can make a coalition in
parliament, could form a government. The Radical leader, Nicolic, has
declared that there will be either a nationalist government or new
elections.
The principal issue in the election was Kosovo, whose formal
declaration of independence on Feb. 17 focused aggressive Serbian
nationalism. Kosovo has a mythical importance for Serbian nationalism,
rather like Jerusalem for the Zionists. It is supposed to be a sacred
ground of Serbian nationalism, although it has not been demographically
Serbian for centuries.
The region was inhabited mainly by Albanians before the rise of the
medieval Serbian monarchy, and after the Serbs’ decisive defeat by the
Ottoman Turks in 1389. The Albanian population has suffered from
repeated Serbian chauvinist attempts to wipe them out and is now
determined not to accept any kind of Serbian authority over it.
The liberals, as much as the hard-line nationalists, accept the Serbian
chauvinist myths, and are equally opposed to any acceptance of the
national rights of the Albanian Kosovars. But the liberals say that
they can oppose Kosovo's independence more effectively within Europe,
whereas the hard-line nationalists say that any integration into Europe
must be predicated on the European Union's accepting the
"territorial integrity of Serbia," that is, rejecting Kosovar
independence.
The liberals wanted to make economic deals with Europe the issue of the
election, as opposed to economic deals with Russia, which has taken a pan-Slavic
position of supporting Serbian nationalism.
However, even Tadic has recently taken a position that Kosovo is more
important than Europe. In its April 26 issue, the liberal Belgrade
daily Danas commented: "In the last session of the UN Security Council,
the president of Serbia, Boris Tadic, spoke with such vehemence that it
is clear that he is thinking of the upcoming special elections. His
party desperately needs votes, and to get votes they need
patriotism."
The hard-line component of the now fallen government, represented by
the minister for "Kosovo and Metodija," Slobodan Samardic,
has pursued a strategy of harassment of the Kosovo government. They are
likewise encouraging the Serbian minority (less than 10 percent of the
population) to refuse to cooperate with the Kosovar authorities and to
carry out de facto separation of the Serbian enclaves—in particular the
largest one, Mitrovica, where the area's most valuable resource, the
Trepca nonferous metals mines, are located.
The former Serbian government and the caretaker government in office
until the elections have been actively trying to dissuade countries
from recognizing independent Kosovo. With the possible exception of
Spain, they have had no luck with any country that has an interest in
relations with Kosovo (all of the neighboring countries, except Serbia,
have recognized or apparently are in the process of recognizing the
Kosovar state). But they have had success with countries, such as
Brazil and Indonesia, that apparently see this as a way of giving
an appearance of being independent of imperialism, since the Kosovars
have declared independence while continuing under the tutelage of
imperialist countries.
A new hard-line nationalist government in
Serbia would probably step up its pressure against Kosovo. Actually,
the previous government adopted an "Action Plan" for such a
strategy, although the liberal ministers were not informed of the
measures that it contemplated. A 100-percent nationalist government
would have no need to be shy about such measures.
Moreover, a victory of the nationalists would increase the chauvinist
harassment of the national minorities living in Serbia, such as the
Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Albanians in the Presevo Valley. The
Hungarians supported the liberal coalition.
The liberals are correct that they could pursue their aim of
reconquering Kosovo within Europe. The imperialist powers have no
fundamental commitment to defending the national rights of the
Kosovars, any more than they defended the other peoples of the former
Yugoslavia against Serbian aggression, until the Serbian atrocities
became too much of an international scandal for them to ignore. In
fact, the imperialists only intervened in Bosnia to save the Serbian
chauvinists from a decisive defeat.
The international capitalist press has ignored the complaints of the
Kosovar Albanian leaders in the Mitrovica area that the UN officials in
charge of the region have allowed the Serbs to exercise effective
independence and to ethnically cleanse the area of Albanians. A
hard-line nationalist government would undoubtedly also be able to get
concessions from the imperialists.
The Kosovar Albanians also have been complaining bitterly about the UN
administration's allowing the Serbs to conduct the Serbian national
elections in the Serbian enclaves. This does amount to recognizing the
Serbian communities as a state within a state, even though the UN
officials say that the vote will have no legal validity.
The Serbian chauvinists are obviously intent on using the Serbian
minority as a wedge for reconquering Kosovo or splitting it up in such
a way as to make it unviable, like the Zionist settlements on the West
Bank. (See www.vetevendosje.org
- the website of the Kosovo self-determination movement, for its
English-language analysis of the "Serb Plan for Kosovo.")
The Serbian minority is faced with a choice of integrating into a
multi-ethnic Kosovo or serving as a fifth column for Serbia. Some
Serbian politicians, such as the Liberal Democratic Party, do
participate in the Kosovar parliament and have been welcomed into the
government in defiance of abuse and even death threats from Serb
chauvinists.
The Serbian government has been promising double salaries to Serbian
public workers who refuse to work with the Kosovo government and
continue to claim to be employees of Serbian governmental authorities.
But it has been slow in keeping its promises, prompting a number of
public protests.
The Russian government has been delivering "aid" to the
Serbian enclaves. But this is essentially an anti-Kosovar provocation.
There are only about 120,000 Serbs living in Kosovo, and there is no
indication that they have special requirements. Despite what needs they
might have, of course, there are undoubtedly many in Russia or among
the Russian minorities in former Soviet republics, that have even
greater ones.
The Socialist Party, the remains of the party of former Serbian
strongman Slobodan Milosevic—who died in an international court prison
while being tried for war crimes—also ran in the Serbian elections.
They call for a return to the policies of their deceased leader, as
well as criticizing the privatizations carried out by the
post-Milosevic government. (Actually the turn toward capitalist
restoration was originated by Milosevic.)
But there is no way that there can be a turn to the left in Serbia
until Serbian chauvinism is rejected. Despite the popular support it
enjoys in Serbia, it is fundamentally incompatible with effective
democracy and therefore with any move toward socialism, which requires
that working people unite to take control of the economy.
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