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What the U.S. Rulers Have to Worry About in Bolivia
by Gerry Foley / March 2006 issue of Socialist Action
newspaper
The
victory of Evo Morales in the Dec. 13 presidential election in Bolivia
initially rang alarm
bells
in U.S. governmental circles and in the international capitalist press. For
one thing, it
continued
a long series of electoral defeats of open acolytes of U.S. imperialism in
Latin America. The capitalist press therefore called it a “new step to the
left” in the region, or even a new step “toward socialism.”
The
capitalists and their mouthpieces had reason to worry. Bolivia is a small
and poor country, but it is where the revolt against the international
capitalist offensive has assumed an active mass and a radical character.
Thus it has become the beacon of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist
revolt in the southern cone of Latin America in particular.
And
Bolivia contains very important natural resources, such as the second largest
reserves of oil and natural gas in Latin America and newly discovered huge deposits
of iron and manganese.
Since
Morales has taken office, formed his government, and made the first demonstration
in practice of the policies he intends to follow, the alarm in imperialist
and pro-imperialist circles seems, at least for the time being, to be
quieting. Thus, Washington Post staff writer Pamela Constable wrote in the
Feb. 21 issue of the paper, ”…for now, at least, the Bush administration is
hoping that Evo Morales, who once threatened to become ‘America's worst
nightmare,’
is a man with whom it can do business.”
The
article continued: “Morales, 46, has already toned down the harsh anti-American
rhetoric that peppered his campaign speeches. Most significantly, he has backed
off from a blanket condemnation of U.S. anti-drug programs as an excuse for
military intervention and has said he will allow such operations to
continue if they abide by Bolivian law.”
On
a more fundamental question, Constable wrote: “A second potential problem
for U.S.-Bolivian ties is that Morales's backers expect follow-through on pledges
of radical economic changes, such as tightening controls over natural gas
reserves, which could discourage foreign investment and push Bolivia away
from U.S.-backed regional trade pacts.
“But
though Morales might seem ideologically compatible with Chavez in Venezuela,
U.S. analysts and officials said Morales appears to be more pragmatic and
open to compromise. They said he may also have more to gain by forging ties
with another neighbor in the region, President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia, a staunch
U.S. ally.”
Historically
the U.S. has never accepted reform regimes in Latin America and connived in
the overthrow of all of them. In the case of Bolivia, the U.S. made deals
for a number of years with the regime put in power by the 1952 revolution.
This succeeded in undermining the gains of the revolution and paving the way
for the installation of a military dictatorship, in 1964.
The
government of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement that took office in
1952 did not lead the revolution, but it was able to rise to power because the
revolution had failed to produce its own political leadership. For some
years, the government remained under the pressure of a revolutionary
workers movement that it was unable to control.
Morales
also is under pressure from a mass movement that he has not led. In 2003
and 2005, mass movements arose against the pro-imperialist policies of the incumbent
administrations that reached the brink of insurrection. Neither Morales nor
his party, the MAS
(Movimiento
al Socialismo), played a key role in these mobilizations. They were led
primarily by the Bolivian Workers Confederation (COB), the Regional Workers
Confederation of El Alto (the working-class satellite city of La Paz), and
the Federation of Neighborhood Councils of El Alto.
None
of these organizations has endorsed Morales. They have also called for
forming a People’s Assembly directly representing the mobilized masses, and
have proclaimed that no bourgeois parliament is going to solve the problems
facing Bolivian working people.
Subsequent
to the election, they declared that they were “besieging” the new
president, demanding that he meet their demands.
Morales’
first major gesture after his election was to go to the stronghold of the
right, Santa Cruz, and announce that he intended to respect private
property and to endorse the demand of the local capitalists and ranchers
for "autonomy"—that is, separation from a central government that
they do not trust.
At
the same time, he announced that he was opening the way for private companies
to take over the vast iron and magnesium deposits at Mutun, in the right-wing-dominated
southeast of the country. That aroused an outcry in the mass movement.
Perhaps as a result, the responsible minister in the Morales government has
announced recently that he is reconsidering this decision. But it remains
to be seen what the resolution of this matter will be.
On
one key question, raising the minimum wage, Morales has reneged on his promise.
In the week before the election, according to the Bolivian website Econoticias.Bolivia,
the MAS candidate promised to triple the minimum wage from 480 Bolivars
($US60) to 1500 Bolivars ($US185). Following the election, however, the
government offered only a 3 percent increase to the teachers and denied
making any promise to raise the minimum wage.
The
teachers and the labor movement are responding with fury to the government’s
decision. Econoticias reported Feb. 8: “In every district, leaders are calling
emergency meetings and assemblies. A renewal of social mobilizations is
imminent. The Central Obrera Boliviana also declared a state of alert and mobilization
in response to Morales’ wage offer and his intention to call a Constituent
Assembly without a majority participation of indigenous and workers.”
The
question of the Constituent Assembly, which is supposed to be elected in
July and to begin sitting in August, is also a focus of conflict for the
new government. The calling of such an assembly was one of the concessions
offered by the previous regime to defuse the mass insurrectionary movement.
An
Argentine Trotskyist organization, the Partido de Trabajadores al Socialismo
(PTS), has noted that Morales’ plan for the assembly is to have it adopt a social
pact among all sections of the Bolivian population, including the
capitalists.
The
PTS reported in the Feb. 21 issue of its international magazine Estrategia,
based on an account in its Bolivian cothinkers’ paper, Palabra Obrera, that
Morales had called for “an assembly to ‘unite Bolivians, respecting their
diversity,’ and to ‘achieve a social pact’ in the framework of the present
political constitution, and seeking agreements with the civic committees,
the entrepreneurs, the Church, and other ‘factors of power.’”
On
the other hand, the right-wing parties are demanding that the Constituent
Assembly confine itself to purely political questions and make no decisions
that affect property rights or the prerogatives of employers. They also
demand that the size of the assembly be limited to assure the predominance
of notables.
Obviously,
there is going to be a prolonged struggle over the conditions for the
election of the assembly and the scope of its authority. These questions
are far from determined now and they will probably be decided in the coming
months by the social mobilization, as well as by the role of the political leaderships
calling for a government based on the masses.
A
more immediate test question for the Morales government is the strike of
the Bolivian national airline (LAB) pilots. This company was partially privatized
in 1996 and looted by its new capitalist ”partners,” to the point that it
is now almost out of money.
The
pilots and the labor movement in general are demanding that the government
“intervene” it—that is, take over the management. They are calling for a permanent
takeover, but Morales so far has agreed only to a temporary “intervention.”
Overall,
it is obvious that in the next six months dramatic social and political
conflicts are going to be played out in Bolivia. It was and will be
necessary to defend the Morales government against the local right wing and
the imperialists. Yet it is clear that it is not going to be this
government but the mass movement and its leaderships that will determine
how
much
the imperialists and Bolivian capitalists will actually have to worry
about.
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