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Sectarian Violence in Iraq Fanned by U.S. Occupation
by Gerry Foley / March 2006 issue of Socialist Action
newspaper
The
response of the anti-American Shiite Islamic leaders to the Feb. 22 bombing
of the Al Askariya mosque in Samarra—such as the Hezbullah in Lebanon and the
leaders of the Islamic republic of Iran—was to blame it on the United
States and Israel. That accusation obviously resonated with their followers
and also with a large section of the Iraqi public.
The
resentment caused by the ruin of the country at the hands of the U.S. and
its occupation by U.S. military forces is so deep and so widespread that apparently
most Iraqis instinctively blame the U.S. rulers for every blow they suffer.
It is certainly evident that the only gainer from the desecration of the
Shiite shrine in Samarra was the U.S. rulers and by extension their Zionist
clients.
Despite
the attempts of Islamic leaders to blame the U.S. for the desecration of
the shrine, the provocation resulted in a wave of reprisals by Shiites against
Sunnis and their mosques. Sunni leaders estimated within two days after the
bombing that almost 200 mosques had been attacked and over a hundred of
their coreligionists murdered, including more than a dozen clerics.
Since
then sectarian murders have continued—in particular, indiscriminate
bombings and executions of groups of Shiites. A recent example took place
near the town of Nahrawan, just east of Baghdad, where dozens of commandos
stormed a power plant and executed dozens of Shiite workers. In fact, such
ruthless attacks on Shiites, including car bombings and suicide bombings,
indicate that there is an element in the resistance that does want to
provoke a sectarian civil war.
Even
in the context of their resentment of the U.S. occupiers, Shiite and Sunni
community leaders vied for the support of U.S. troops against the threats
they faced from hotheads on both sides.
For
example, in the Feb. 23 New York Times, correspondent Edward Wong quoted a
leading Sunni politician, Mahmoud al-Mashhadany of the Consensus Front, the
major Sunni political bloc, as follows: Mr. Mashhadany also accused the
American military of standing aside as Shiites slaughtered Sunnis. ‘The security
portfolio is in the hands of the Americans, but yesterday we didn't see any
Humvees,’ he said. ‘We didn't see any military reaction.’”
In
the Feb. 24 British Guardian, Simon Tisdall noted: “But, perversely, Shias
blamed the US yesterday for failing to protect Samarra. Sunnis accuse the
allies of turning a blind eye to [Shiite] militia death squads.”
Samarra
is a city wrecked by the American military. It was a guinea pig for the
devastating assault on Falluja, which drove out nearly all the
population. In the case of Samarra,
about half of the population have fled the city. It is a majority Sunni
city, although it is also the site of one of the main Shiite shrines.
Actually, it appears that the shrine was in the custody of Sunnis,
according to Raed Jarrar, a local Iraqi blogger, interviewed by the
Pacifica radio
program
“Democracy Now” on Feb. 24.
An
AP dispatch reported Feb. 22 that Abdul-Aziz al Hakim, the leader of one of
the principal Shiite political organizations—the Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution, which has its armed wing—denounced the U.S. ambassador for
criticizing Shiite militia men and members of the armed forces and police
for sectarian attacks on Sunnis. Al-Hakim said, “These
statements
were the reason for more pressure and gave green lights to terrorist
groups. And, therefore, he shares in part of the responsibility [for the
bombing of the Askariya mosque].”
A
spokesman for the [Sunni] Muslim Clerics Association denounced the Shiite
leaders for calling mass protests against the bombing, which he said
encouraged reprisals against Sunnis and Sunni holy places. A Feb. 23
Reuters dispatch quoted him as saying: “‘Why didn't I see these people rise
up against the Americans when they attacked the shrine of Imam Ali?’ he
added, referring to a Shi'ite shrine in Najaf damaged in 2004 fighting
between U.S. forces and those of radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.”
Many
of the attacks on Sunnis and Sunni mosques in Baghdad and in some other
Shiite centers have been attributed to the militia led by Moqtada al Sadr,
who has been a vociferous advocate of the unity of Muslims against the
Western imperialist powers.
Al
Sadr was out of Iraq at the time of the Samarra bombing and the Shiite
protests that followed it. He put the blame for the outrage on the
occupiers. But it seems that his followers spontaneously went on a rampage
against Sunnis, although that must have been the last thing that al Sadr
wanted.
In
April 2004, preceding the uprising referred to above, he led an uprising
against the occupiers in Najaf that coincided with a major confrontation between
the U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents in Falluja. Some Sunni spokesmen
pointed to that in their response to the Shiite reprisals against their
sect and its holy places.
Al
Sadr, in fact, spoke out against reprisals against Sunnis. But the press
accounts and interviews with local Shiites in the areas where attacks
occurred indicate that the actions of al Sadr’s Mahdi Army were spontaneous
local actions not controlled by any central command. This militia organization
is made up mainly of very poor and frustrated urban youth and does not have
the means for a strong organization.
Mahdi Army members have guns and rocket launchers but little else.
Moreover,
al Sadr claims that attacks on Sunnis were carried out by provocateurs
mascarading as members of the Mahdi Army. And that would fit in with other indications
that there is an element in the resistance that is deliberately stoking the
fires of sectarian
warfare.
On the other hand, The New York Times of
March 3 gives a detailed report of a takeover by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad
of a mosque previously held by Sunnis.
It notes that this was a former Shiite mosque given to Sunnis by
Saddam Hussein, so Shiites thought that they had a legitimate claim to it.
But in the wake of the conflict touched off by the bombing of the Al
Askariya mosque, it was the worst imaginable time for a confrontation with
Sunni clerics on any pretext.
The
Mahdi Army has been caught between two fires. It has called for the unity
of Sunnis and Shiites against the occupation, but it has assumed
responsibility for defending Shiites against attacks by Sunni
insurgents. The Samarra bombing was
in fact the culmination of a
long
series of attacks on Shiites, apparently carried out by the al Qaida wing
of the resistance. These attacks have typically been murderous bombings of crowds
of Shiites, pilgrims, worshippers, mourners, and laborers, designed simply
to kill as many people as possible without making any distinction.
The
al Qaida leadership has justified attacks on Shiites on the grounds that
the Shiite religious leaders are allies of the U.S. occupation and that the
Shiites are traitors to Islam. The U.S. and Iraqi authorities have claimed
that al Qaida has a deliberate policy of trying to provoke a civil war between
Shiites and Sunni. Even though such a policy would play totally into the
hands of the occupiers, there are more and more indications that this is
the line that al Qaida is following.
The
worst atrocity in the violence that immediately followed the bombing of the
Al Askariya mosque was the execution on the outskirts of Baghdad of 47
people, both Sunnis and Shiites, who were returning by bus from a united
Sunni-Shiite demonstration to protest
the
desecration. They were stopped by men dressed as police, taken from the
bus, and executed with shots at close range to the head.
In
human terms, this was a far greater outrage than the destruction of the
tomb of legendary saints dead more than a thousand years. And it seems to
be a political outrage, a deliberate punishment of Sunnis and Shiites who
tried to demonstrate against sectarian conflict. And the modus operandi
seems to point to al Qaida, which has been carrying a long series of
well-organized
attacks in which their operatives have been dressed in Iraqi police or army
uniforms.
Iraqi
government leaders and U.S. officials have blamed al Qaida for the bombing
of the Al Askariya mosque. Al Hakim, for example, has said that the blame has
to be placed on this largely non-Iraqi organization, not Iraqi Sunnis. But
al Qaida in Iraq has not claimed the attack. One press dispatch has claimed
that a website used by al Qaida declared that the Shiites themselves bombed
the shrine to have an excuse to attack Sunnis. But this report is still to be
confirmed.
In
any case, it clear that there are serious reasons to believe that al Qaida
was responsible for the outrage and for the sectarian conflict it
provoked. Unless, the leaders of al
Qaida in Iraq repudiate hostility to Shiites or unless they are effectively
subdued by forces in the insurgency devoted to uniting the resistance to
the occupation, sectarian conflict is likely to continue to worsen and
serious weaken the Iraqi resistance to the U.S. occupation.
Of
course, the capitalist press has been commiserating with the U.S. authorities
who claim that the sectarian conflict is complicating the tasks of their
operation in Iraq. Representative John Murtha, who has been calling for a
partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, has responded to the recent conflict by
saying that the U.S. forces are caught in a civil war and that they should
withdraw from it.
It
is undoubtedly true that the U.S. is playing a very a high risk-balancing game
in Iraq. (Murtha has cited a poll showing that 88 percent of Sunnis approve
of the resistance’s attacks on U.S. forces, and that 41 percent of Shiites
do.)
However,
the effect of these sectarian conflicts has been to impel Sunni politicians
as well as Shiites to appeal for protection to the U.S. forces. This is a clear
indication that it is precisely such conflict that is the best justification
for the imperialists maintaining their forces in Iraq.
And
there is evidence that the U.S. wants to keep a foot in Iraq for a long
time, despite its claims that it intends to withdraw as soon as Iraqi
forces can “maintain security.” That is indicated by the huge investments
by the United States in building massive military bases there.
The
political problems of the resistance are obviously becoming more and more
complicated. If it is going to defeat the imperialist project for
establishing a dependent regime in the country it is going to need to come
up with a formula for a movement and a government that can effectively
represent all Iraqis.
Such
a formula will have to be based on the material interests of the masses—and
not any religious identifications, much less religious enthusiasms—and on a
program that can offer the masses clear goals so as to make them less
susceptible to counterproductive spontaneous explosions. Hopefully, the
disastrous events of Feb. 22 and the following days will impel thoughtful
elements in the resistance to seek such a formula.
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