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By his decision to increase the numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq,
President Bush is not only escalating the counterinsurgency war that the
American military has been conducting there. He is also threatening to widen
the war by picking fights with new adversaries, the most important of
which is Iran.
Bush’s
move is reminiscent of Nixon’s extension of the Vietnam War to include
Cambodia when the U.S. forces had failed to defeat the Vietnamese forces,
except that Iran is a far more powerful potential foe than the Cambodian
rebels.
In
Iraq itself, Bush is moving toward war on an important section of the
Shiite community, which has been the major political buffer for the U.S.
occupation, thereby risking total political isolation of the U.S. forces.
In recent months, the majority of Shiites have also tipped over to
supporting attacks on U.S. forces. Among the Arab Sunnis, support for
such attacks is virtually unanimous.
It
became evident even before Bush’s State of the Union address that the
main target of his escalation now is the movement of the radical cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia.
The
British magazine The Economist reported Jan. 25: “The American army says
that 16 Mahdi Army commanders have been captured in recent weeks and that
American and Iraqi forces have carried out 52 operations against Mahdi
Army targets in the past 45 days. Some 600 Mahdi Army members, the
Americans say, are now awaiting trial.”
In
a Jan. 18 dispatch, the Associated Press give a fuller account: “The
midlevel Mahdi Army commanders, who spoke to The Associated Press on
condition of anonymity because the group operates in secret, said at
least five top commanders of similar standing were captured or killed in
recent months, including one snatched in a night raid from his Sadr City
hide-out on Tuesday. They refused to name him.
“Two
other key officials at the top of the organization were killed in raids
last month: Sahib al-Amiri, a senior al-Sadr military aide, was slain by
American forces in the Shiite holy city of Najaf on Dec. 27. The U.S.
military reported his death, calling him a criminal involved in roadside
bombings. Al-Sadr lives in Najaf.
“The
other top commander, identified by a third Mahdi Army commander as Abu
al-Sudour, was shot to death in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid last month as
well. He was hunted down in Sadr City.
“The
third commander, who also spoke anonymously to protect his identity, said
U.S.-led raiding parties were now also engaged in massive sweeps, having
rounded up what he said was every male old enough to carry a gun in south
Baghdad's Um al-Maalef neighborhood Tuesday night.”
The
assault on the Mahdi Army is a major political, as well as military escalation.
The militia is estimated to have 60,000 members and has for years totally
controlled the huge Sadr City slum in Baghdad, inhabited by more than 2
million people, and is also a major force in the cities of the
predominately Shiite south. Moreover, the al-Sadr movement is not just a
military and political organization but a social one that maintains
essential community services in Sadr City. It is deeply rooted.
Al-Sadr
has been the most outspoken opponent of the U.S. occupation in the Shiite
community. He has led two military uprisings against the U.S. forces,
seeking to raise the entire Shiite community in revolt against them. He
has also identified strongly with Hamas in Palestine and the Hezbullah in
Lebanon.
Al-Sadr
has historic links with the Islamic Republic of Iran, although
paradoxically less than the movement of Abdel Aziz Hakim, the Supreme
Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and his militia, the Badr
Brigades, which is less hostile to the U.S.-led occupation and apparently
used by the U.S. government as a counterweight to al-Sadr.
Up
until now, the U.S. commanders have maintained a cautious attitude to the
Shiite militias, because the risk of becoming totally isolated among the
Iraqi population. The only support or even toleration they enjoyed in the
country has come from the Shiites and Kurds who were the victims of
brutal repression at the hands of the Saddam Hussein regime. The Kurds
make up about 20 percent of the population, the Shiites about 60 percent.
The
U.S. pretext for the assault on the Sadrist movement is that it has been
responsible for numerous revenge attacks on Sunnis since the bombing of
the Samara mosque in February 2005. This is despite the fact that al-Sadr
himself has denounced such attacks and called for unity against the
occupiers. The U.S. authorities claim, however, that he is not able to
control many of the Mahdi Army commanders.
The
Economist article even speculated that what seemed to be passivity on
al-Sadr’s part in the face of the U.S. offensive against him was because
he wanted the occupying forces to do the job for him of getting rid of
his unruly followers.
However,
there could be many reasons for his holding back from an immediate
counteroffensive. Most fundamentally, his political stance is contradictory.
He has built his movement on the basis of radical opposition to the U.S.
role in the Middle East, but he is now participating in a regime that is
essentially a client of the United States rulers. In fact, he is a basic
prop of the al-Maliki government, and as a reward for that has gained
control of some key ministries and also a certain protection against U.S.
attacks.
Thus,
al-Sadr has a stake in maintaining his association with the
U.S.-supported government. He has recently rejoined the government after
a two-month’s boycott in protest against al-Maliki’s meeting with Bush.
The
Economist article and other press reports claim now that al-Maliki, under
U.S. pressure, has decided to stop trying to shield the Sadrists. (The
U.S. occupiers may simply have given him an ultimatum.) But it remains to
be seen how far this will go or what it will mean for the present
essentially Shiite government.
It
is, of course, possible that al-Sadr does not have either the
determination or the organization to conduct consistent resistance to the
U.S. occupation. There could also be a more elementary reason for
al-Sadr’s apparent passivity. He must know that his movement is facing a
major repressive onslaught. He could just be reorganizing to face it and
feeling out the lay of the land.
The
Los Angeles Times reported Jan. 26 that al-Sadr had endorsed the U.S.
security plan for Baghdad. But is not yet clear exactly what he signed
onto or why. It may be that the continuing murderous attacks on Shiite
crowds by Sunni insurgents linked to al-Qaida forced him to accept any
measures that the Shiite masses may hope will stop the slaughter. But
here again, he could simply be making a tactical maneuver. A number of
top U.S. spokespersons have referred to this possibility.
Whatever
the role of the Sadrist movement in the sectarian conflict, it has been
clear from long before it arose, from the start of the occupation, that
the U.S. and its allies had to break or housebreak al-Sadr’s movement
before they could achieve the sort of neocolonial client regime that the
U.S. rulers have taken enormous risks to achieve in Iraq.
It
may be that al-Sadr’s movement is breaking under the pressure of U.S.
threats and its own internal divisions and corruption. But is also
evident that new formations have been arising out of the Sadrist
movement, which may prove to be more consistently radical and more
politically advanced.
Thus,
even if al-Sadr crumbles in the face of U.S. threats and repression, it
is possible that the occupiers’ offensive against the major Shiite
militant organization can lead into a war with radicalizing Shiite
masses. That would multiply the numbers of resistance fighters the
occupiers are combating.
In
this context, there have been some obscure episodes that have been exploited
to some extent by the U.S. military propagandists. The first was a
sophisticated commando attack on an American unit in Karbala, a mainly
Shiite city.
Some
U.S. spokespersons have claimed that it was a joint operation of the Mahdi
Army and Iranian intelligence. But no evidence has been presented to
support this claim, which in fact conflicts with the overall stance of
al-Sadr.
The
argument is based solely on speculation that only the Iranian services
could carry out such an operation. But there have been a number of
similar, equally sophisticated operations carried out by al-Qaida.
Then
there was the battle with an apparently mainly Shiite cult, the Army of
Heaven. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of cult members. But it
might simply be another example of the slaughter of a cultist community
that armed itself, withdrew from society, and thereby aroused the
suspicions of the authorities.
Bush’s
escalation apparently means that he is not aiming to control the
situation in Iraq by political maneuvering but by brute force, double or
nothing, win by a knockout. In this sense, he is taking on more and more
enemies.
A
notable element of the State of the Union speech was its threats against
Iran, which have now been followed up by orders to capture or kill
“Iranian agents.” The only evidence the U.S. has yet been able to offer
of Iranian support for the resistance is a number of sophisticated
detonators on roadside explosives said to come from Iran. In fact, it is
not unlikely that at least elements of the Iranian regime are giving some
support to the resistance.
The
Islamic Republic of Iran is a populist regime that maneuvers between
imperialism and the anti-imperialism of the masses. But is almost
certainly playing some sort of double game, not openly opposing the U.S.
occupiers but giving some back-handed support to the resistance at the
same time.
However,
a similar double game has also been played by Pakistan, which, along with
Egypt, is supposed to be the U.S.’s main ally in the Muslim world, or
even by Saudi Arabia.
The
Pakistani regime has been conducting military actions against supporters
of the Taliban, but there is more and more evidence that at least a
section of the Pakistani intelligence service is continuing to give them
aid and comfort. Apparently much of the funding of the Iraqi resistance
comes from sources linked to the ruling class in Saudi Arabia and
probably the bulk of the funding for al-Qaida.
However,
it is obvious that Iran has not been throwing its weight behind the
insurgents. If it had, the U.S. would have faced a far more deadly foe
than it has. Iran has a long border with Iraq and a well-developed
military technology, as well as organizational expertise. That was shown
in the impressive resistance that the Lebanese Hezbullah, armed and
trained by Iran, was able to put up against the Israeli army.
In
fact, the website of the Arab nationalist TV station Al Jazeera reported
Jan. 30 that Sunni Islamists are criticizing Hezbullah for not supporting
the Iraqi resistance: “Irsheed [a Jordanian Islamist deputy] said:
"Hezbollah should clearly back the resistance in Iraq. They cannot
ask people to support their resistance in Lebanon and at the same time
stand short of supporting the resistance in Iraq.”
Now
Iran has joined Saudi Arabia in trying to negotiate an end to the crisis
in Lebanon that threatens the U.S.-backed government of Fuad Siniora.
Thus,
since the U.S. assault on Iraq, the Iranian regime has clearly opted for
a modus vivendi, or tacit collaboration, with the U.S. effort. Now Bush
has decided to blow that up. The needs of combating the Iraqi resistance
cannot be the cause. It is more likely that the objective is to combat
Iranian influence in the region in general and perhaps even to create the
specter of a wider war so that he can continue building up the power of
the U.S. military.
Bush’s
escalation in Iraq is clearly a double-or-nothing strategy. And as such
it represents an extremely dangerous new phase in the adventurism of
declining U.S. capitalism. So, it is more and more urgent that the
majority of the American people who oppose this war stand up and demand
an immediate end to it before the reactionary U.S. rulers charge deeper
into the mine field.
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