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The
end of the year was the occasion for balance sheets of the Iraq war both
by the press and U.S. government officials. Generally these accounts
stressed that although 2007 was the deadliest year of the war for U.S.
forces and for Iraqis, both civilians and members of the security
forces, there has been a notable decline in casualties in the last six
months. This decline was
supposedly owing both to the increase of U.S. troops and the success of
the occupation forces in enlisting local allies against al-Qaeda.
However,
commentators in the major U.S. press and U.S. military commanders have generally
been warning that the relative decline in insurgent attacks may prove
only a temporary lull and that a number of possible scenarios could
lead to a new upsurge in fighting, perhaps going far beyond anything
seen so far. In other words, there is no indication that the U.S.
ruling class is any closer to achieving the objectives for which it
launched the war. And in fact it seems clear that the U.S. war and
occupation have made Iraq into a giant powder keg.
The
U.S. occupation's most highly touted success, the enlistment of Sunni
militias (gangs, in reality) against al-Qaeda is already beginning to
show its drawbacks. An article in the Dec. 26 Christian Science Monitor indicated a dilemma for the
U.S. occupation:
"Abdul-Aziz
al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, told worshippers
gathered near his office in southwest Baghdad that the so-called
awakening groups, many of whom once fought against U.S. forces but have
since turned their guns on extremists, must side with the government.
'I stress the necessity of having the awakening councils be on the side
of the government in chasing terrorists and criminals, but not be a
substitute for it,' al-Hakim said. 'Weapons should be within the hands
of the government only.'"
However,
the article went on to note: "The United States has been pushing
the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government to integrate the awakening groups
into the Army or police. That's something the Iraqis have been
reluctant to do so far, worried that their guns might end up turned on
them."
In
conclusion, the article quoted from a blog by Pat Lang, a former State
Department advisor: “Many problems remain in Iraq. The central government
remains the monstrous engine of ethno-religious factional politics that
the Coalition Provisional Authority [the initial occupation government]
created....
“At
present the US has accepted as temporary allies many of those who
fought against us before the 'Anbar Awakening.’ That is as it should
be. We should continue that policy in other parts of the country. What we should not think is that our
former enemies have become reconciled to a permanent US military
garrison in their country. To think that would be a terrible
mistake....
"Bottom
Line? Those who fight beside us now will fight us again if we decide to
occupy their country permanently."
However,
there is abundant evidence, despite some denials, that the U.S. intends
to maintain long-term bases in Iraq, and an AP dispatch of Nov.
26 indicated that the U.S.'s client government in Baghdad is preparing
to formally ask them to do that. After all, the U.S. needs to maintain
its military dominance of the country in order to secure the objectives
for which it is sacrificing trillions of dollars, thousands of American
lives, and hundreds of thousands of Iraq ones—that is, full control
of the Iraqi oil reserves.
Furthermore,
some of the decline in attacks on U.S. troops apparently stems from
tactical decisions by forces that are fundamentally hostile to the U.S.
presence, such as the movement of Moqtada al-Sadr and splinters from it
that are more closely linked to radical elements within the Iranian
state apparatus. The dominant
forces within the Iranian regime are probably hoping that a Shiite-dominated
government friendly to Iran will ultimately emerge from
the political turmoil created by the war and occupation.
Ironically,
the U.S.'s principal ally among the Shiite organizations, the Supreme
Council of the Islamic Revolution and its militia, the Badr Brigades,
have closer links to Iran than Moqtada al-Sadr. As for al-Sadr himself, he
continues to maintain an important foothold in the administration of
the U.S.-backed government, most notably in the health services, and
has called on his followers to avoid confrontation with the occupation
forces until further notice. Such tactical stances could be reversed at
any time for many possible reasons.
At
present, the U.S. military has run into a stone wall
in trying to extend its "awakening councils into areas controlled
by the Shiite militias. A Dec. 22 dispatch from the McClatchy news
service reported:
"Recently, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, a Shiite,
has directed that no councils be formed in the predominantly Shiite
areas of southern Iraq, where violence is caused primarily by rivalries
between the Mahdi Army militia loyal to Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr
and the Supreme Council's Badr Organization militia.
"In
recent weeks, the government has taken steps to quash any possible
formation of awakening councils."
The dispatch quoted a leading member of the Supreme Council as
saying that the U.S. intended to enroll 70,000 members of awakening
councils in the predominately Shiite south and was offering to pay
every member $300 a month, an extremely seductive sum in the conditions
of poverty and unemployment that have developed in Iraq since the invasion. The Supreme Council member in
question warned that the U.S. use of such means to hire armed stooges
threatened to spread destabilization in the country.
In
Baghdad, al-Sadr's organizaton is threatening violent retaliation
against anyone who joins the "Awakening Councils": "In
Baghdad's Abu Dsheer neighborhood, a Shiite area in the mostly Sunni
Dora district, one man reported that he tried to join the local
security volunteers organization, primarily because $300 was double his
current salary as a cleaner. But the Mahdi
Army
threatened to kill anyone who joined and burn down the local council's
building. Fliers headlined 'the final warning' were posted throughout
the area."
Moreover,
indications have begun appearing that the most important de facto
allies of the U.S. occupation, the conservative Shiite clerical leaders
like Ali al-Sistani, are losing their influence because of mass
disillusion with the U.S. client government they support.
Thus,
the Washington Post reported Dec. 21: "Two
years after helping to bring to power a government led by Shiite
religious parties, Iraq's paramount Shiite clerics find their influence
diminished as their followers criticize them for backing a political
alliance that has failed to pass crucial legislation, improve basic
services or boost the economy.
"'Now
the street is blaming what's happening on the top clerics and the
government,' said Ali al-Najafi, the son of Bashir al-Najafi, one of
four leading clerics collectively called the marjaiya."
U.S.
relations with its other major ally in Iraq, the Kurdish nationalists, are also becoming more
difficult, because it has to try to juggle between them and a strategic
ally for the entire region, Turkey, a state that views Kurdish
nationalism in general as a threat to its existence. In order to
appease the Turkish regime, the U.S. government has decided to sanction
and even collaborate with Turkish military incursions into, and
bombing, of the autonomous Kurdish area in Northern Iraq.
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