Socialist Action /July 1999
IAM union 'leaders' bargain away contract gains at TWA
By GERRY FIORI
The workers of Trans World Airlines, the country's eighth largest carrier,
have been without a real raise since 1983. The 16,000 workers represented
by the International Association of Machinists, 75 percent of the company's
employees, have given up an average of $100,000 each since 1992.
These concessions were supposedly necessary to keep the company from
going out of business (TWA continues to exist despite claims to have turned
a profit only once in 20 years).
Management's promises to restore the givebacks once the company's financial
situation improved were reneged on at the first opportunity. In fact, the
arrival in 1997 of a new management team led by Gerald Gitner (a protege
of union buster Frank Lorenzo) heralded a new level of confrontational anti-union
policies.
When the old contract expired on Sept. l, 1997, the company's new proposals
demanded the absolute right to eliminate, combine, and/or cross-utilize
job classifications, contract out any and all work, sell off any assets,
subdivide the company, and set up subsidiary companies flying so-called
"regional" jets.
Maintenance facilities in New York, Kansas City, and Los Angeles, and
one of the two terminals leased at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York,
were singled out for elimination, despite protective covenants existing
from the last contract (and despite the fact that these facilities were
being used as securities for loans from creditors).
In fact, as TWA continued to concentrate its operations in its hub, St.
Louis, where it is the largest employer, the jobs of workers systemwide
were at risk.
The company's position was strengthened through the divide-and-conquer
tactic of buying off the Air Line Pilots' Association-the only other significant
union aside from the IAM. ALPA leader Bill Compton was named TWA president
in December 1997 and CEO in May 1999 (while Gitner became chairman of the
board of directors).
In July 1998, ALPA and TWA signed a new contract, which included a 40
percent wage increase for the pilots over four years. Two small unions soon
reached their own agreements. This left only the IAM to deal with.
The leadership of District 142 of the IAM has been largely responsible
for the condition of their membership, having colluded for years with management
to extract concessions "to save the company."
The new and obvious threat from Gitner and Compton, however, seemed to
have finally opened their eyes, and they took up a militant posture in negotiations,
declaring "the concession stand is closed'.
The company's attitude throughout negotiations was completely unserious
and in bad faith. However, due to provisions of the Railway Labor Act (which
also applies to airlines), the union was hampered by being given a whole
series of hoops to jump through before it could have legal recourse to strike
action.
Despite an obvious impasse having been reached, the federal mediator
overseeing the talks refused to release the parties to the 30-day countdown
to "self-help" until May 11, 1999, one year and eight months after
negotiations began.
Workers reject offer, authorize strike
On May 28, TWA presented its "final" offer to the IAM, saying
take it or leave it. The company's proposed contract, to expire in 2002,
included:
1) Raises of 18 percent for mechanics and higher classifications, 9.6
percent for related classifications below mechanic (ramp service, fleet
service, janitor, guard, etc.), 14.1 percent for passenger service employees
(ticket agents), and 26.7 percent for flight attendants.
The last of three wage hikes would be contingent on TWA's reaching a
target operating profit margin. Pay raises would not be retroactive.
2) Lump sum payments of $4600, $4100, $2100, and $5000 for the respective
employee groups.
3) The flight attendants only would receive payment of the "Me Too"
grievance.
(This refers to a provision of the last contract in which any raise given
to one classification would have to be given to all. The company was taken
to court by the flight attendants when it granted non-contract employees
an 8.5 percent raise, and lost. All IAM classifications should have been
entitled to the same award.)
4) Company contribution to the IAM national pension plan of $.50 per
hour worked.
5) Regional jets to be introduced, according to arrangements agreed to
by ALPA, not the IAM.
6) The company agreed to "work to obtain" leases at a terminal
and maintenance hangar at New York, and a hangar at Kansas City.
The company pushed hard for this offer with a barrage of propaganda letters
sent to workers' homes, praising the offer, claiming there was absolutely
no more money to give, and threatening dire consequences if the offer was
rejected.
But the union leadership responded within a few days, calling for the
membership to reject the company's offer.
In a special bulletin, they pointed out that the company's offer contained
substantially less in wages than what the pilots got, that wage and benefit
increases were distributed usually to different classifications, that there
were no protective covenants over facilities in dispute, and that the regional
jet clause would allow a third party to operate TWA routes without TWA employees
and with no limit to the number of planes.
They said they would hold out for nothing less then industry-standard
wages, full protective covenants, no less than $1 per hour in the pension
plan, and no loss of jobs.
Ratification votes were held June 8-9 systemwide for the flight attendants,
who vote by mail, which takes a month. By June 9, though, the stance of
District 142's leaders, combined with the determination of the membership
not to give in to the company again, resulted in a vote of 90 percent to
reject TWA's offer and to authorize a strike.
The next day, company negotiators got in touch with the union, as did
Dick Gephardt, congressman from St. Louis and Democratic Party leader of
the House of Representatives. On June 13, a tentative agreement was reached.
Anger swells as victory turns into defeat
After nearly two years of negotiations, and many more years of givebacks,
the workers sensed that their determination to stand up had finally paid
off, and victory, a contract they could afford to live on, was finally at
hand.
But once the details of the agreement became known, the hope turned into
disbelief, then anger. This was because a strange transformation had taken
place.
The leaders of the union, who had led a two-year crusade against concessions,
who had orchestrated work stoppages and sickouts, who had said they would
settle for nothing less than what their members deserved, who had obtained
that membership's solid backing to go on strike if necessary, had completely
reversed themselves.
The tentative agreement was to be 18 months long, from Aug. 1, 1999,
until 2001, completely conceding retro pay (and rewarding the company's
intransigence in negotiations). Details include:
1) Wage raises of 11.7 percent for all job classifications except flight
attendants, who would receive 21.3 percent due to the 8.5 percent "Me
Too" award, which would be waived by the rest of the IAM.
2) Lump-sum payments (out of a separate grievance settlement) of $1000
for ramp service and above, $500 for classifications below, and $1000 for
those who retired between the end of the last contract and the beginning
of the new one.
3) Company contributions to the IAM national pension plan of $1 hour
for mechanics and above, and $.75 per hour for others.
4) Regional jets to be introduced with set limits of jets, operated by
TWA, subsidiaries, or partners.
5) The company to agree to "work to obtain" leases for the
New York and Kansas City facilities.
6) The union to agree to the company opening up "focus stations,"
which would be non-union over reviewable six-month period for purposes of
"competitive" expansion. (The first is to be San Juan and is already
being heavily funded by the government of Puerto Rico).
This deal was sold by the union leadership as being necessary because
the company had no more money to give (despite what they had said only days
before) and that this was the only way to save everyone's job.
In reality, it represented the worst betrayal of rank-and-file Machinists
who had shown themselves willing to take the fight to the end and believed
their officials would be willing to lead them.
The worst part of the agreement is that, for all the concessions it makes,
it offers no guarantees of saving any jobs at all. The disputed facilities
may in fact never be leased, and would have no protective covenants anymore
in any case.
(This is leaving aside the question of the second New York terminal,
which was dropped by the union without gaining anything in return).
The regional jets may be operated by nonunion commuter affiliates, or
by subsidiaries with separate, probably substandard IAM contracts (dues
money in any case). These jets can ultimately displace TWA operations directly
or indirectly, especially at hub cities, leading to loss of jobs.
The focus station concept leaves itself open to enormous abuse by the
company, including shifting operations there from unionized stations.
Everything depends on the trustworthiness of TWA management, who have
already amply demonstrated the opposite.
This is all leaving out the issue of the 14 stations that would be closed,
something withheld from the membership in official union materials.
The ratification meetings for the tentative agreement, held two weeks
after the final offer meetings, were extremely tumultuous, as workers one
after the other expressed their outrage at being so cheaply sold down the
river by those they had believed were finally doing the right thing.
Union spokespeople were unable to answer pointed questions from the ranks
and in the end resorted to scare tactics, saying that any contract improvements
would come only through job losses and work rule concessions.
As of the date of this writing, all the votes have yet to be counted.
As far as is known, New York and Kansas City have overwhelmingly rejected
the agreement; St. Louis, Los Angeles, and San Francisco have approved it.
The overall vote looks to be close. Regardless of the outcome, though,
the Machinists of TWA have learned at least two valuable lessons:
The first is that their "leaders" are self-serving bureaucrats
only interested in preserving their own privileges, and afraid to wage a
real fight.
The second is that the rank and file have already demonstrated that they
can unite to fight, and that their power is in that unity and the willingness
to use it.
Where leaderships will not lead, they must step aide or be swept aside
and replaced by fighters. All fighting Machinists should come together now,
and organize to build a movement within the union capable of waging the
honest struggle we all know is necessary.
Gerry Fiori works at TWA and is a member of IAM Local 1058, New York.
Socialist Action /July 1999 |