|
No Blood for Coal!
by Bill Onasch / February 2006 issue of Socialist Action
newspaper
Nearly
48 hours after a conveyor fire broke out at Alma No. 1 Mine in Melville,
West Virginia, rescuers recovered the bodies of two missing miners. These victims
brought the total of American coal miners killed on the job during the
first three weeks of January to 15. This figure exactly equaled the number of
GIs killed in Iraq over the same time span.
While
conditions in underground mines can never be controlled as well as those in
a factory or office, there is no acceptable reason for this level of workplace
carnage. As Anne Feeney’s song says, “We just come to work here—we don’t
come to die!” Many have said that
these men were killed as a result of corporate greed. Certainly the
avaricious appetite of the mine operators has been whetted by the recent spike
in coal prices. Coal moves in lock step with gas and oil and has benefited
from the disruptions in the supply of those other fossil fuels by the Iraq
war and damage from Katrina.
Increased
demand from the steel industry has also contributed to the more than
doubling of coal prices over the past year or so. That’s been a great incentive
for the coal bosses to speed up production, cutting corners in the process.
They are also digging deeper and returning to older mines once furloughed because
they were unprofitable when prices were lower. Certainly, this drive heightens risks for those who dig the
coal.
The
Jan. 2 explosion that killed 12 at the Sago mine in West Virginia could
have been contained in the abandoned part of the mine where it occurred had
traditional concrete barriers been in place. Instead, the operator, pinching
pennies, had used a foam barrier—which failed, allowing the deadly contamination
to spread.
About
a week after the Sago disaster, Cornelius Yates, 44, was killed at the
Maverick Mine in Pikeville, Kentucky, when a section of roof, measuring approximately
20 feet wide, 4 1/2 feet thick and 10 feet long, fell on him. Like many
small mines in that part of Kentucky, the operator tried to get by without the
expense of reinforcing cracking roofs.
The
Alma No. 1 Mine used its conveyor belt to draw fresh air to the working
face below. That’s a cheap solution but when a fire breaks out on a belt–as
happened at Alma No. 1—the belt tunnel can carry flames and deadly gases
directly to the miners’ work area, or to vital evacuation routes.
But
greed alone doesn’t explain the upsurge in accidents. Greed is a constant
factor in every
capitalist
enterprise but is often confined by restraints that the workers have put in
place through struggle over the years. Historically, coal miners have
relied on their union and government regulation for safety and health
protection. But both institutions have been seriously undermined by the bosses
and their politicians. When those constraints are weakened, runaway
corporate greed turns deadly. It’s
worth reviewing some of the history of the industry, the union, and the
government institutions they deal with.
The industry
Steam
was the engine of the Industrial Revolution and coal was its fuel. To ensure
supplies at a predictable cost, the railroads and steel mills had their own
“captive” mines to keep the locomotives and coke ovens running. Other
operators supplied bituminous coal for other industrial customers and to
electric utilities. Ultimately,
most of these formed the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA),
which negotiated a master agreement with the union. Anthracite mines produced
coal for residential and commercial heating. Prior to World War II, it was a labor-intensive industry,
employing hundreds of thousands, with only incremental changes in
technology.
After
the war there were drastic changes both in the coal market and in mining
technology. By the end of the 1950s, diesel-electric traction virtually eliminated
the coal-burning steam engines on America’s railroads. Residential heating
was almost totally converted to gas or oil, knocking anthracite mining for
a loop.
Technology
hit the coal work force with a vengeance as huge equipment was developed
for strip mining, and long-wall and high-wall shearing by giant machines decimated
jobs under ground. Later came mountaintop removal, devastating to the
environment and dangerous
to
nearby communities.
With
the adoption of the Clean Air Act, the demand by electric utilities for low
sulphur coal (coal fired plants produce half of U.S. electricity) attracted
capital away from Appalachia to the strip-mine paradise: Powder River Basin
in Montana/Wyoming. Steel and rail
companies spun off their coal-mining operations, and there were other big
shifts in mine ownership, ultimately leading to the breakup of the BCOA.
United Mine Workers of America
Miners
have fought for relief from harsh and dangerous conditions since the first
mines were opened. The Molly McGuires were one such early struggle popularized
in film.
Several
localized currents came together to form the UMWA in 1890. At a time when
most craft unions excluded Blacks from membership, the miners had Black delegates
at their first convention and African Americans made up about 20 percent of
the membership in 1900.
A
prominent early leader was Richard L. Davis, a Black socialist who
counseled his brothers, “I would advise that we organize against corporate
greed, organize against the fellow who through trickery and corrupt legislation,
seeks to live and grow fat from the sweat and blood of his fellow man. It
is these human parasites that we should strive to exterminate, not by blood
or bullets, but by the ballot...”
But
bullets were all too common as the union had to battle company thugs,
police, and state militias during organizing and collective bargaining
campaigns. Nineteen Pennsylvania
miners were killed, and 50 wounded by sheriff’s deputies in the 1897
Lattimer Massacre. Wives and children were among the 20 killed in the 1914
Ludlow Massacre, when a private security force directed a coordinated
attack with the Colorado state militia, machine gunning and burning a
strikers’ camp.
The
chief architect of the bloodshed in Colorado also unleashed a 1920 reign of
terror against miners in Matewan, West Virginia, (also the subject of an excellent
movie) but was himself killed by the town chief of police while trying to
illegally evict miners from their homes. History shows the mine operators have
never shrunk from killing their workers to protect their profits.
But
these murderous attacks failed to break the spirit of the miners. Joe Hill’s
admonition, “Don’t mourn—organize!” was picked up and popularized by Mary Harris
“Mother” Jones. This remarkable woman became a full-time advocate for
worker causes at an age when most retire. Though also a founding member of
the Industrial Workers of the World, and an activist in the Socialist
Party, she is perhaps best remembered for the work she did with the UMWA.
She
helped bring the truth about the miners’ struggles to the broader working-class
public. For example, she exposed the shameful practice of child labor in
the mines with the 1903 “Children’s Crusade”—a march from a working-class
neighborhood of Philadelphia to Oyster
Bay,
N.Y., the home of President Theodore Roosevelt.
When
she died in 1930 at the age of 93, she was buried at the Union Miners
Cemetery in Illinois, next to victims of the Virden, Ill., mine riot of
1898. Her funeral was attended by thousands of mine workers. But the miners didn’t mourn the passing
of Mother Jones—they kept organizing, bringing most mines in the Eastern
United States under union contracts. More than that, the UMWA was the
principal driving force in the launching of the CIO, leading to the
greatest labor upsurge in our history.
The
UMWA won decent wages for their members and went on to establish health-care
networks in the rural areas where most mines are located. They came to
enjoy good pensions and vacation time.
But workplace safety and health issues remained an ongoing
challenge. There were still occasional major accidents underground; there
was also the deadly occupational disease that became known as Black Lung.
As
they say in the union’s official history, “Because of the dust created in coal
mines, the UMWA was forced to become expert in occupational lung diseases
such as silicosis and pneumoconiosis.
In
1969, the UMWA convinced Congress to enact the landmark Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act. That law changed a number of mining practices to
protect miners’ safety and provided compensation for miners suffering from
black lung disease. Perhaps most important, it was the first time that
Congress mandated the elimination of a man-made occupational
disease.
Despite reductions in coal-mine dust concentrations, after 25 years this
mandate still has not been fulfilled—coal miners still suffer from black lung.”
In
1977, the union won another major victory with the 1977 Mine Safety and Health
Act, which for the first time established enforceable regulations and put substantial
numbers of inspectors into the field—similar to what OSHA did for general
industry. But the structural
changes in the industry have steadily weakened the union in numbers and
bargaining
power.
Between automation, bankruptcies, ownership changes, and some major lost
strikes, the UMWA today has only about 15 percent of the membership level
it had at the end of World War II; only about seven percent of mine industry
workers are under a union contract.
The
three mines where the January disasters took place are all nonunion.
Government regulation
MSHA,
like its emaciated cousin OSHA, has taken a real beating at the hands of
the present administration. Since
Bush took office 170 staff positions at the agency have been eliminated.
The 2006 budget slashed MSHA funds by another$5 million.
Worse
yet, mine rescue teams have been cut in numbers and scattered geographically.
One of the teams eliminated was at the MSHA office in Morgantown, W.V., just
a few miles from the Sago mine—where it took 12 hours for the first team to
arrive.
The
Bush MSHA not only deep-sixed proposed new improved regulations pending
when they took over; they also reversed some long-standing ones. Most
important was dumping a 36-year-old rule that there must be separate ventilation
and conveyor tunnels in underground mines. As we have already noted, the conveyor
belt fire at Alma No. 1 spread deadly smoke
and
gas precisely because it doubled as a ventilation source.
Current
acting MSHA director David Dye was asked to testify before a Senate hearing
about mine safety. After reading a
prepared statement, and before any questions could be asked, he abruptly
arose, announced he had business elsewhere, and left. An assistant explained
he had to check on a mine fire. It turned out the fire was in an abandoned
mine, had been
burning
for two months, and the strategy was to let it burn itself out.
Bush
has nominated a new permanent director, Richard Stickler, a former coal
boss. UMWA president Cecil Roberts said, “America’s coal miners don’t need
a coal company executive in charge at MSHA. We need a person who
understands safety from the miner ’s point of view, and is committed to
making the health and safety of the miner the agency’s first priority once
again.” The union has, at least so
far, won a victory of sorts in the investigation of the Sago disaster.
Several families of the victims asked the union to be their representative
in the investigation and hearings—something they are entitled to do under
the law even though the union isn’t certified to bargain for the miners. At
first, company guards physically blocked the union representatives
entrance. Later, a judge ruled they must be admitted and they are
participating
in the investigation while the company appeals.
What can be done?
Coal
is dirty and needs to be replaced ultimately with alternative fuels. But
that’s not going to happen as long as we have a market-driven economy. In
the meantime, there are steps that can be taken to prevent the kind of
disasters we saw in January.
1)
Enough rescue teams standing by to be on the scene of an accident within an
hour’s time.
2)
Equip miners with more substantial breathing devices. Currently they have
only an hour supply.
3)
Electronic locating and text-messaging devices, in use in about 40 American
mines today and in every Australian mine, to supplement hard-wired communication
that is often knocked out in accidents.
Of
course, prevention is always preferable to response. Not only are strong
regulations needed—they must be enforced.
Union
mines are safer mines. In the past the miners generously helped others to
organize. Today we need to build solidarity to help them organize the
death-trap nonunion mines.
We
can’t count on government regulators when the employers’ twin parties
appoint coal bosses to police coal bosses. This is another strong argument
for building a party of our own to take power to defend our interests. It’s
no accident that the United Mine Workers is an early and ardent affiliate
of the Labor Party.
No blood for coal!
|
