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In
our last issue we described efforts by United Auto Workers dissidents
to defeat a contract at GM that let the company dump its obligations to
retirees' health care and included other historic concessions.
On
Oct. 10 the GM pact was approved by 66 percent of the members voting.
The same day, the UAW leadership announced a tentative agreement with
Chrysler after a six-hour strike, which tops even the farcical two-day
strike in September at GM and may be the shortest national strike in
U.S. history.
Five
days later the union's nine-member Chrysler bargaining committee met to
consider the pact. In its first vote it unanimously rejected the
proposed agreement. Pressure from top UAW leadership led to three more
votes, with six against and three for, then five against and four four,
and finally all but one in favor.
That
one was Bill Parker, chair of the bargaining committee, a leader of the
New Directions dissident movement in the 1980s and ’90s, and president
of Local 1700 at the Sterling Heights, Mich., assembly plant. Parker prepared a minority report
for the Chrysler Council, the body of local presidents and
committeepersons, which met next to consider the agreement. The vote
total there is unknown, as a motion for a roll-call vote was rejected
in a voice vote that was itself too close to call.
A long list of concessions
Parker
denounced the pact for being too similar to the GM contract, which, he
said, "ends many of the principles established 70 years ago in the
UAW's birth." He urged rejection. Among his objections:
•
A lower tier of wages and benefits for new workers, which would foster
division and create pressure to reduce top tier wages and benefits (as
happened at GM spin-off Delphi). New hires will start at $14 per hour,
half of what current employees make. Instead of a traditional
defined benefit pension, new
hires will get a defined contribution pension, and instead of health
benefits, a 401(k) on which to draw.
•
The creation of "non-core" jobs. As at GM, these would
include all jobs off the assembly line—including those traditionally
bid on by high-seniority workers to escape the killing pace of the
line. The number of these jobs is left up to further talks by a
union-management committee. Twenty-two out of 53 plants will be 100%
non-core once existing employees leave, whereas at GM it was done for
particular jobs within each plant.
•
The outsourcing of janitorial and similar jobs. Restrictions on outsourcing of other
jobs are "dependent upon a favorable business case."
•
A $3000 bonus but no wage increases, and huge diversion of
cost-of-living allowances.
•
Cut-off of job bank funds after two years if the laid-off employee
refuses to take a job anywhere in the country.
•
Further elimination of job classifications and melding of jobs into
homogeneous "team" positions. (The "team" concept
has been a major tool used to convince workers their fate is tied to
the company's profits. It has also been a bonanza for union bureaucrats
given cushy jobs leading these "teams.")
•
The GM agreement converted 3000 temporary employees to permanent,
full-time status, but none would take place at Chrysler.
•
Retiree health-benefit concessions voted down in 2005 (but passed the
same year at GM and Ford) would be implemented. As at GM, a union-run
trust fund (called the Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association or
VEBA) will be set up, into which Chrysler will dump its obligations to
retiree health care. It will begin with funding of only 53% of the $19
billion owed by the company (compared to GM's funding of 70 percent of the $51 billion it owed—still
not enough to make a secure plan).
Even
before the VEBA is set up, retirees will be hit with increased
premiums, deductibles, and co-pays. Unlike at GM, where the VEBA was
perhaps the biggest focus for dissent, it received much less attention
at Chrysler in comparison to opposition to the
second-tier
and non-core jobs and the lack of job security commitments. This could
be due to the younger average age of Chrysler workers.
The
deal-killer for Parker was the lack of job guarantees like the ones
supposedly in the GM deal. GM,
he said, had granted a "moratorium on outsourcing" and a
"plant-by-plant commitment of current and replacement
product." Product means a particular model, and replacement
product means new models after previous ones are phased out.
Virtually
no Chrysler plant, in contrast, received replacement product
commitment. This, said Parker, would allow management to get locals to
bid against each other to prove who can do the work cheapest in hopes
of securing future product. In addition to new product commitments,
Parker insisted any pact must include a guarantee that new hires could
progress into higher-paying jobs. The dissident group Soldiers of
Solidarity (SOS) soon sprang into action, distributing Parker's letter
and generating their own analyses of the deal.
In
the first few days of voting the pact was rejected by six locals
representing about 11,000 workers, often by huge margins. In that same
period it was approved by 10 others, representing about 8650 workers
(precise vote totals for each local were not released). This was especially
encouraging to dissidents as a contract rejection would have been the
first at any of the Big Three since a “no” vote at Chrysler in 1982.
Fearing
defeat, UAW Vice President General Holiefield called for "all
appointed union representatives" to "stand in solidarity in
support of this agreement."
Needless to say, the jobs of appointees depend on towing the
company line (pun intended).
Local presidents received letters from Holiefield praising the
contract’s clauses on health care for current workers, alleged limits
on plant closings and outsourcing, and creation of new jobs.
Voting
was originally supposed to end Oct. 24 but was extended to give the
leadership a chance to browbeat members. But the extra time also gave
dissidents a chance to do more education and agitation.
After
voting began, Reuters reported "previously undisclosed product
commitments to select factories that go beyond the 2011 expiration of
the deal." News also spread that Chrysler voting might be halted
in favor of switching to talks at Ford—obviously in hopes of getting a
similarly lousy deal approved to increase pressure on Chrysler workers.
The media speculated that rejection of the pact would not lead to
another strike, and that the company would insist that union leadership
get members to revote until they got it right.
Workers
also had to weigh the likelihood that Chrysler's new owner, private
equity firm Cerberus, would not honor even the threadbare promises in
the contract but would, in typical private equity fashion, split up and
sell off parts or all of the company.
Such fears made some workers angrier and more likely to vote
no—but scared just as many into voting yes for fear of their jobs.
After
a few days the bureaucracy's mobilization began to have an impact, and
four big Detroit-area plants, representing over 9000 workers, approved
the contract on Oct. 24.
Lay-offs proceed at GM and Chrysler
As
voting proceeded, SOS leader Gregg Shotwell reported that the plant
making GM's hottest selling vehicles was laying off 1000 workers,
despite the fact that they had been working mandatory Saturdays to keep
up with demand. Most of those laid off were temps who had been told by
managers they would have permanent positions if the contract were
ratified.
Shotwell
urged Chrysler workers at the last major plant yet to vote, in
Belvidere, Ill., to demand the UAW "put every promise in writing,
sign it, and date it."
His
advice turned out to be far-seeing. At an informational meeting before
Belvidere voting began on Oct. 27 it was announced that the third shift
of 1000 workers was being eliminated. First to go will be the plant's
temporary workers who have no seniority rights.
The
high-level UAW official who mentioned the layoffs at a membership
meeting didn't realize members had not yet been told. He refused to
answer questions on the layoffs, and talked instead about how great the
proposed contract was. In the end, 55% of Belvidere workers voted no.
But this left the overall total narrowly in favor, with yes votes of
56% among production workers and 51% among skilled trades (as well as
94% of office workers and 79% of engineering workers, both much smaller
categories).
Less
than a week after ratification, Chrysler announced the elimination of
six shifts and close to 12,000 jobs in the U.S and Canada. This follows
two post-ratification stabs in the back at GM. As Chrysler workers were
voting, GM said it would move 56,000, or 75%, of its current workers,
into retirement over the next four years, replacing them with non-core
workers. And on Oct. 25, GM
said 2000 workers were being laid off despite the pact's so-called job
protections.
These
events should serve as warnings to Ford workers. On Nov. 3 the UAW leadership reached
a tentative contract with Ford; union president Ron Gettelfinger was
seeking rapid approval by the membership. Ford is demanding even deeper
concessions than at GM or Chrysler as the only way to avoid massive
layoffs. In our next issue we
will cover the results of the Ford talks. And with this year's Big
Three talks wrapped up, we will provide an overview of the situation
facing those who want to change the union's course to try to reverse
the concessionary tide.
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